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Abstract 
We examine the influence of optimism about local and foreign people on social cooperation using a public 
goods game. Firstly, we find that optimism fuels social cooperation, and secondly, that this positive effect 
holds when optimism is focused either jointly or individually. 
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1. Introduction 
The pre-eminent social value of cooperation in fulfilling human needs based on diverse motivations as 
suggested by Maslow (1943) cannot be over-emphasized. This value is well-exploited in social constructs 
like families, organizations, communities and even nation-spaces.  
Social cooperation, its evolution and stability can be understood from a number of perspectives: social value 
orientation (see Balliet et al., 2009); social norms (e.g., Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004); group bias (e.g., Dorrough et al., 2015; McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016); conditional cooperation or 
reciprocity (e.g., Kocher et al., 2008; Fischbacher & Gaechter, 2010; Smith, 2013); context-specificity (e.g., 
Rand & Nowak, 2013); and so on. 
Economic studies (e.g., Croson, 2007) have shown that personal beliefs about the cooperative behaviour of 
group members correlate with an individual’s own contributions. This contribution in turn can be explained 
by commitment, altruism and reciprocity theories. The commitment approach suggests that own 
contributions will be positive and constant or unconstrained by others’ contributions (see Laffont, 1975); 
the altruism approach also implies positive own contributions which may be inversely-related to others’ 
contributions (see Andreoni, 1989, 1990); finally, reciprocity theories imply contributions that are positively 
related to others’ contributions (see Kocher et al., 2008; Sugden, 1984). From evolutionary biology, 
theoretical explanations suggest that it is to individual’s benefit (or self-interest) if social cooperation is 
directed towards the in-group; but costly to the decision maker (but beneficial to the recipient) if directed 
toward out-group (Hamilton, 1964). A special case of indirect benefits is altruism, where the behavior is 
costly to the decision maker and beneficial to the recipient (West et al. 2007).  
Group optimism effects on individual social cooperation remain inadequately explored given that most 
studies are focused on “in-group favouritism versus out-group prejudice” divide which depicts only a 
scenario out of four possible group belief scenarios that include “in-group pessimism versus out-group 
pessimism”, “in-group pessimism versus out-group optimism”, and “in-group optimism versus out-group 
optimism”. Specifically, this study is novel in exploring social cooperation across a range of group optimism 
standpoints (in-group; and out-group)1. These show the effects on cooperation separately and combined, 
coupled with other personal characteristics, in a public goods setting.  In generally terms, we find that being 
optimistic about either group promotes social cooperation. 
The next section sets out our methodology, followed by the results, and lastly, the conclusions.  
 
                                                          
1 In-group = Spanish; out-group = combination of Africans, Asians, Latin Americans and Western which is defined 
as native English-language speakers e.g., Americans, Britons, Canadians, Australians etc. 
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2. Experimental design and procedures 
The basic game is a standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We set up groups of four members who 
interact for 5 periods. Every subject is endowed with 100 coins (of 2 euro cents each). In Task 1, each 
subject decides how much to allocate between her private account and a public account, with ci,t ∈ [0, 100].  
Task 1’s payoffs in period t are given by 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 100 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 0.375 ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑡
4
𝑗=1 . 
Task 2 required participant i to make guesses about the mean contributions to the public account (in number 
of coins) of the entire group of participants (including their selves) for each round. We created an incentive 
scheme contingent upon errors, ei,t = gi,t − ¯ct where gi,t  is the guess of subject i in period t, and  c¯t is the 
observed mean contribution for round t. This scheme is set out as follows: 
 if |ei,t| > 10, subject i received 0 euros; 
 if 5 < |ei,t| ≤ 10, subject i received 1 euro; 
 if 0 < |ei,t| ≤ 5, subject i received 2 euros; and 
 if ei,t = 0, subject i received 20 euros. 
Participant i’s payoff in Task 2 is determined by using only one of the five rounds selected at random.   
On completion of this task, participants were instructed on how to compute the mean of their guesses: 
?̅?𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑐(=
∑ 𝑔𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑡=1
5
). Task 3 then required participant i to make guesses about the average contribution of each 
of the four out-group populations (African, Asian, Latin American, and Western). Participants were 
informed that similar experiments had been performed in other parts of the world.2 The payment system in 
Task 3 is similar to that of Task 2. Finally, in Task 4 participants answered a set of questions designed to 
elicit information on their personal and family characteristics, and beliefs.  These included gender, exposure 
to foreign travel, sport participation, political beliefs, parental education, participation in household tasks, 
and household culture.  The complete experiment lasted approximately one hour with participants earning 
13.47 euros on average.  
The experiment was conducted in two waves at the University of Granada, Spain with 152 first-year 
Economics students (68 females, age-range 17-41, mean age 19.02, SD age 2.32) as participants. The first 
wave was conducted in 2007 and the second wave in 2011 with sample sizes of 48 and 104 respectively. 
 
                                                          
2 For the four out-groups under study, the actual average contribution data (𝑐?̅?𝑓𝑟 = 51.75; 𝑐?̅?𝑠𝑛 = 24.89; 𝑐?̅?𝑎𝑡 =
48.75; 𝑐?̅?𝑒𝑠 = 20.30) used in computing the payoffs were sourced from previous studies (Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).   
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3. Results 
On average, subjects contributed 35.45 coins (SD 20.68) to the public good in the course of the five rounds 
of the experiment; this average was 28.47 (SD 19.33) coins in the first wave of the experiment and 38.67 
(SD 20.58) in the second wave. 
Table 2 shows the real average contribution and the average guess of each group (Locals, Africans, Asians, 
Latin Americans, and Western). Angerer et al. (2016), in a prisoner’s dilemma game, show that young 
children have difficulty guessing the average contribution of other children but this difference declines with 
age. We find no large errors in our (university) student sample when guessing the average contribution of 
locals (4.37 tokens), but the difference between guess and real contribution increases when subjects have to 
guess the behavior of foreigners performing the same task. The average error (in absolute value) when 
making guesses about foreigners goes up from 6.64 to 20.74.    
  
Real avg 
contribution 
Avg 
guess 
Min 
error 
Max 
error 
Average 
error 
Std. 
Dev. of 
error 
% 
Positive 
error 
Locals 35.45 39.81 -32.45 42.55 4.37 14.42 63.8% 
Africans 51.75 45.11 -51.75 48.25 -6.64 24.41 38.8% 
Asians 24.89 45.63 -24.89 67.11 20.74 19.54 85.5% 
LatinAmericans 48.75 39.25 -46.75 41.25 -9.50 16.13 29.6% 
Westerns 20.30 40.12 -17.30 69.70 19.82 16.63 86.8% 
Table 1: Contributions and errors 
Since our objective is to study the relation between the own average contribution and group optimism, we 
created the variable Optimism that takes value 1 if the Guess about group j is above the Real average 
contribution of this group (j = Locals, Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and Western) and 0 otherwise. If 
a subject is optimistic about the contribution of 3 or 4 foreign groups, this subject is considered optimistic 
about foreigners. This approach seems plausible because our interest includes exploring the combined out-
group optimism (instead of individual group optimism) effects on social cooperation. 
Interestingly, subjects’ optimism between in-group versus out-group is 61.8% to 46.1%; while within the 
out-group, it is highest to the Western (86.8%) followed by Asians (85.5%), and next is the Africans 
(38.8%), and the least is to the Latin Americans (29.6%).  
The average own contributions of these 4 types of subjects are shown in Table 2 below. 
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Subject Type N Mean Std. Deviation 
Not Optimistic 44 24.60 14.72 
Optimistic about locals only 38 35.00 20.03 
Optimistic about foreigners only 14 39.76 22.26 
Optimistic about both groups  56 43.55 21.39 
Total 152 35.45 20.68 
Table 2: Average contribution by subject type 
An ANOVA allows us to reject the equality of means (p-value = 0.000). Post-hoc tests show that the average 
contributions of the non-optimistic subject type is statistically different from the average contribution of the 
other 3 groups (all p-values < 10%), while the average contributions of the other 3 types of subjects are not 
statistically different from each other (all p-values > 10%). 
Table 3 shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the average own contribution 
and the independent variables are the subject type (the excluded category is Not-optimistic) and personal 
control variables (sex, foreign exposure, sport exposure, political beliefs, parental education, household 
chores, household culture, and the wave of the experiment).3 
Dependent variable: Average own contribution   
  Coefficient Std. Err. P-value 
Optimistic about locals only 10.28 4.40 0.021 
Optimistic about foreigners only 13.23 6.13 0.033 
Optimistic about both groups  17.03 4.39 0.000 
Female 5.16 3.42 0.134 
Foreign Exposure 3.63 3.98 0.363 
Sport Exposure -3.22 4.33 0.458 
Political Belief -0.03 1.40 0.983 
Parental Education 0.01 0.33 0.973 
Household Chores -0.91 1.10 0.409 
Household Culture -0.72 1.41 0.608 
Wave 4.02 3.95 0.311 
Constant 19.65 4.60 0.000 
Nb observations 152     
Prob > F 0.002     
Table 3: Estimation of the contributions to the public good 
                                                          
3 A brief description of the control variables is offered in the appendix. 
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Table 3 shows that the average own contribution is highest if the subject is optimistic about both groups 
(locals and foreigners), but it is also higher than the omitted category (Not-optimistic) if the subject is 
optimistic about only one of the two groups.4 
Interestingly, optimism about the contributions of foreigners whose behavior will not affect subjects’ 
payoffs in any way increases their contributions to the public goods. 
None of the control variables has significant effects on the average own contribution. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Often the influence of group identification in social cooperation has been explored from the restrictive 
perspective of in-group favoritism versus out-group prejudice. This study has focused on exploring 
optimism about both groups in social cooperation.  
Our results show first that the positive relationships observed between both in-group optimism and out-
group optimism on social cooperation are consistent with theories of reciprocity and altruism.  
Secondly, we find that being optimistic about the in-group, or the out-groups, or about both types of groups 
at the same time does not have different effects on subjects’ cooperation.   
Finally, the finding of no difference in average cooperation between in-groups and out-groups suggests that 
simple binary social categorization (“us” and “them”) is inappropriate for more complex behavior (Tajfel, 
1982). This may be because the elementary, relational, and egocentric forms of simple binary categorization 
are cognitively inadequate in more complex social cooperation (Shkurko, 2014), but this evidently requires 
further study. 
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4 Nonetheless, running regressions excluding other categories, we find that subjects belonging to the other 3 categories 
do not behave differently in terms of average own contributions to the public good. 
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Appendix: Description of the control variables 
Female: It shows the gender of the subject. Femalei =1 if the subject is female, and Femalei = 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign Exposure: It is a measure of the number of foreign trips earlier undertaken by the subject and it 
takes value 0 if the number of country-trips < 3 and takes value 1 otherwise.  
 
Sport Exposure: This is a measure of the type of sporting activities engaged in by the subjects and it takes 
value 1 if at least one “expensive sport” is practiced by the subject, and 0 otherwise. We consider as 
“expensive sports”: golf, paddling, rugby, ski, surf, and tennis. 
 
The two variables Foreign Exposure and Sport Exposure are used as indicators of the individual wealth of 
the subjects. 
 
Political beliefs: It goes from −3 (least conservative) to +3 (most conservative). 
 
Parental education: It is a measure of the joint educational status of both parents and was computed as = 
Education of mother ∗ Education of father with both going from 1 (basic education) to 4 (highest education). 
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Household Chores: This is a measure of the schedule of household chores among family members and it 
goes from −3 (most poorly divided) to +3 (equally divided). 
 
Household Culture: It is a measure of the schedule of household leisure activities among family members 
and it goes from −3 (only indoor leisure) to +3 (include outdoor leisure). 
 
Wave takes value 1 if the experiment was conducted during the 2011 wave, and 0 if it was conducted in 
2007.  
 
 
 
 
